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Abstract:  
Even though the shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ labour market policy exhibit large cross-
national variations, they all seem to share two common characteristics; 1) the first group 
exposed to the new policies and the group exposed to the harshest policies was young 
people on social assistance and 2) as the target group gradually came to include 
‘ordinary’ unemployed, most countries made exceptions for the oldest unemployed. The 
article argues that this striking policy convergence has to do with the public perception of 
the target groups. The article substantiates this argument 1) by giving a theoretical 
explanation for the different popular images of target groups and 2) by showing - using a 
national Australian sample - that these general popular images influence the way the 
public wants ‘active’ labour market policy to be conducted.  
 
Keywords: Labour market reforms, blame avoidance, target groups, public opinion, 
deservingness criteria 
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Introduction  
Since the mid 1990s most OECD countries have implemented a number of labour market 
reforms aimed at reducing the level of structural unemployment. Using the language of 
policy makers themselves the changes can be characterised as a shift from ‘passive’ to 
‘active’ labour market policy. Within the OECD area the reforms were guided and 
monitored by the ‘OECD job strategy’, which was one of the organisation’s largest 
projects in the 1990s. Within the European Union a framework for guiding and 
monitoring the labour market reforms in the different countries was also established. 
However, it is widely recognised that the new ‘active’ labour market policies came in 
many different varieties (Lødemel & Trickey, 2000; OECD 1998). These substantial 
cross-national differences can be given many different explanations e.g. the colour of the 
government in power, the previous social and active labour market policy in place, the 
level of experienced unemployment, the strength of unions etc. Another typical 
explanation is that countries follow different labour market trajectories because they 
belong to different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996, 2000). 
Even though these ‘active’ labour market reforms seem to be more and more 
diverse the more one looks at them they share two common features. Firstly, in most 
countries the group first exposed to the new policy measures and the group exposed to 
the harshest measures was young people receiving social assistance, typically below 25 
years old. Secondly, as the target group for the new active labour market policy gradually 
came to include ‘ordinary’ insured unemployed, most countries made exceptions for 
older unemployed, typically those aged above 50 years. In some countries the older were 
included in the target group but often on a much more voluntary basis (see below). 
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The question is how we can explain this striking policy convergence when 
everything else within these programs seems to follow country or regime specific 
trajectories. One explanation – which those in power would prefer – is that it is simply 
the most rational policy to conduct. The argument would naturally go that the return from 
‘pushing’ young unemployed is high due to the fact that will be on the labour market for 
a long time. And policy makers would rightly argue that the harsher treatment often goes 
together with a rather expensive effort to provide education and jobs for the young 
unemployed. The other way around, the return from ‘pushing’ and ‘investing’ in older 
unemployed is modest due to the fact that they in any case soon will leave the labour 
market.  
 However, the return of investment argument cannot stand alone. It contradicts the 
basic wisdom from political science that policymakers are much more concerned about 
winning the next election than making an economic rational policy. The aim of this 
article is to show that we also find a political logic behind the policy convergence - a 
political logic that primarily has to do with the public perceptions of the target groups.  
 A number of scholars have paid attention to the political logics behind current 
welfare reforms.  First of all we turn to the growing literature on the political dynamic of 
welfare state retrenchment. Pierson, being one of the pioneers (Pierson, 1994, 1996 and 
2001), has argued that retrenchment is a political exercise in blame-avoidance. 
Retrenchment means taking something away from someone, and those suffering these 
(concentrated) loses are likely to react negatively. Furthermore, a body of survey studies 
consistently show that the welfare state is popular with the electorate in general (e.g. 
Bean & Papkis, 1993; Svallfors, 1997) i.e. not only the ‘losers’ but also the general 
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public are likely to react negatively to retrenchment. Thus, according to this literature the 
tension between necessary reforms pursued by the policy elite and a reluctant 
constituency form a major conflict line in modern politics. The literature often use the 
label ‘the new politics’ of the welfare state in contrast to ‘the old politics’ of the 1960s 
and 1970s, where politicians fought about getting credit for the pursued welfare policy. 
Following the main reasoning within political science, the ‘new politics’ literature 
has mainly explained the degree of public resistance with the strength of the affected 
interests, e.g. the number of clients and public employed within a certain policy area. In 
contrast this article emphasises the moral logic connected to different deservingness 
criteria and shows how this logic overrules both self-interests and general political 
orientation. Our argument combines the ‘new politics literature’, the policy analyses that 
emphasise popular images of the target groups (e.g. Schneider & Ingram, 1993), and the 
deservingness literature (see below). The empirical endeavour is to prove the soundness 
of this theoretical reasoning in the field of labour market reforms. Naturally, there is not a 
one to one relationship between public attitudes and policy decisions, which also will 
become evident in the case we study.  But a number of recent studies have proved that 
public attitudes towards welfare policies most of times actually influence public policy 
(e.g. Brooks & Manza; Burstein, 1998; Jacobs, 1993).  
 
The two convergences in the shift from passive to active 
First of all we need to substantiate the argument about a policy convergence. The claim 
that young unemployed on social assistance is treated more harshly than other 
unemployed and old unemployed are treated more softly primarily rests on country 
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specific knowledge about the implementation of active labour market policy in the 
Nordic countries. To our knowledge nobody has made cross-national analyses of special 
treatment of different groups of unemployed and neither OECD nor other international 
organisations seem to have statistics on that matter.1 It is outside the scope of this article 
to deliver this. However, by looking at the legislation in four selected countries we 
deliver circumstantial evidence for the soundness of the claim.  
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Table 1: Special conditions for young and old unemployed found in Denmark, UK, 
Australia and Germany. 
Examples of tighter conditions for young 
unemployed 
Examples of looser conditions for older 
unemployed 
Denmark:1 
- 1990: Mandatory activation for 18-19 years 
old on social assistance.  
- 1998: unskilled under the age of 25 only paid 
half of normal unemployment benefit.  
 
 
Denmark:1 
- 1992: A special early retirement scheme for 
older unemployed. From 55 years, later from 50 
years. 
- 1994: Extended period of unemployment 
benefit for unemployed above 50 years. 
- 2000: Possible to free unemployed aged 58 
and 59 from mandatory activation. 
UK:2 
- 1986: Introduced Income support gives lower 
benefits to 18-24 years old. 
-1988: Exclusion of almost all under the age of 
18 from eligibility to unemployment support. 
- 1990: Removal of student from the 
unemployment risk pool. 
- 1996: Reduction in benefit level for 
claimants aged 18-24 (by 20 %). 
- 1998: New Deal program for young under 25 
years. 
- 1999: New Deal Partner program made 
compulsory for under 25 years old 
 
UK:2 
(- 1981: Higher Supplementary Benefit for 
unemployed over 60-year olds who choose to 
early retire). 
 
- 2002: 45 years old and above freed from 
mandatory New Deal for Partners. 
Australia:3 
- 1995: Youth Training Allowance conditioned 
on participation in socalled ‘approved 
activities’.  
- 1997: Mandatory participation for 18 – 24 
years in ‘work for the dole’. 
- 1998: Mutual Obligation activities for 18 to 
34 years old (tougher obligation for 18-24 
years old).  
 
Australia:3 
- 1994: Age limit for ‘relaxed reporting’ and 
removal for requirement to search for fulltime 
work reduced from 55 years to 50 years. 
- 1994: A special ‘Mature Age Allowance’ not 
subject to ‘activity test’ for long-term 
unemployed above 60 years. 
Germany:2 
- 2003: Tighter suitability criteria for young 
unemployed. 
- 2004/05: Unemployed under 25 years only 
entitled to benefits  (ALG II) if offers of 
training, suitable employment or other 
integration measures accepted.   
Germany:2 
- 1985: Older than 49 years entitled to longer 
benefit period (ALG – Arbeitslosengeld). The 
age limit later reduced to 43, 42 and later 
increased to 45 (1998) and 55 (2004). 
  
1Source: Goul Andersen, Albrekt Larsen & Bendix Jensen, 2003. 
2Source: Clasen & Clegg (forthcoming). 
3Source: OECD, 2001: 166-169. 
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The countries are selected so each type of welfare regime is presented. At the 
same time we have looked for countries that have made a significantly shift from 
‘passive’ to ‘active’ policies. From the social democratic welfare regimes we pick 
Denmark, as she in recent years has been the frontrunner for activation policies in the 
Nordic countries (e.g. Albrekt Larsen, 2002). In the conservative regimes we do not find 
as well developed activation policies. However, following the so-called Hartz-
commissions Germany has recently introduced some of the most comprehensive 
measures. From the liberal regimes we pick UK, where a shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ 
policies were a major part of the third way rhetoric. We also include Australia because 
survey data from the Australian case will be used in the further analyses. Furthermore, a 
comprehensive OECD study, ‘Innovations in labour market policies: The Australian way’ 
(2001), has actually made the Australian case internationally known.  
From reading table 1 it is clear that in all four countries we can find examples of 
‘harsher’ rules for young unemployed, especially those on social assistance, and 
examples of ‘softer’ rules for old unemployed. Thus, we do see indications of a policy 
convergence – even across welfare regimes or call it across countries with very different 
labour market trajectories. We assume that examples of ‘harsher’ treatment of young and 
‘softer’ treatment of older unemployed can be found in most other labour market reforms 
in the Western countries.2 The main task of the article is to give a theoretical explanation 
of differences in popular perceptions of these target groups and try to test it empirically.  
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Deservingness criteria and popular images of target groups 
A promising way to theorise the popular images of different target groups is found in the 
literature on deservingness. Within this framework it becomes obvious that young people 
on social assistance have difficulties in meeting what seem to be a number of almost 
universal deservingness criteria. If we follow the review in Oorschot (2000) five so-
called deservingness criteria are of importance.  
 
1) Control (the less control over neediness, the higher degree of deservingness). 
 
2) Need (the greater the level of need, the higher degree of deservingness). 
 
3) Identity (the higher the degree of group belonging, the higher degree of 
deservingness). 
 
4) Attitude (the more grateful, docile and compliant, the higher degree of 
deservingness).  
 
5) Reciprocity (the higher previous or future payback, the higher degree of 
deservingness).  
 
Especially the issue of control seem to be important for the public (Oorschot, 2000). 
Thus, the key to explain the finding that the public in general express little concern about 
unemployed is that this group is perceived to be much more in control of their situation 
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than e.g. disabled, sick, and pensioners. In De Swaan’s (1988) historical study of the 
modern welfare state, he labelled the criterion ‘disablity’. In Cook’s (1979) study of 
Americans’ views on supporting the poor, she labels the criterion ‘locus of 
responsibility’. Finally, Will (1993) also found that the most important deservingness 
criterion was the degree to which the problems facing poor families were beyond the 
immediate control of the individual family. Following this logic it is understandable why 
a number of empirical studies have found a connection between level of unemployment 
and the public assessment of causes of poverty, i.e. poverty is being much more 
explained by ‘lack of will power’ or ‘laziness’ in times with low unemployment  
(Albrekt Larsen, 2006; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Gallie & Paugam, 2002; Eardley 
& Matheson, 1999). In our case the argument is that the job or education possibilities of 
young unemployed are typically seen as being much better than those for the older 
unemployed. It gives the impression that the young are more in control of the situation 
than older unemployed.   
The identity criterion refers to the importance of feeling a shared identity with the 
groups who are to be supported. Using the label of proximity, De Swaan argues that the 
boundary of the area can be defined by kinship relations, by place of residence, or more 
generally, by the boundaries of a certain identity group, like ‘our family’, ‘our town’, ‘our 
church’ or ‘our people’. Lack of shared identity with young social assistant claimants can 
be expected to be quite common. The active rhetoric of mutual obligation often comes 
with an undertone of teaching the unemployed the right work ethic. This fits perfectly 
with young social assistance claimants. It is more difficult to apply on older unemployed, 
who probably have learned the societal norms through a long life.  
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The attitude criterion refers to the way recipients respond to public support. De 
Swaan uses the term ‘docility’ to highlight that poor who hide their misery and ask for 
nothing are seen as more deserving than those who make impudent demands. Cook uses 
the terms ‘gratefulness’ and ‘pleasantness’. Here the popular image of an ungrateful 
youth (maybe even with long hair) again speaks against the deservingness of young 
social assistance claimants and in favour of the old unemployed. Finally, the attitude 
criteria can be linked to a more general criterion of reciprocity, e.g. such behaviour as 
‘the smile of thanks’. Oorschot (2000) argues that needy who at the moment are unable to 
reciprocate might fulfil this criterion if they have contributed to ‘us’ in the past, or are 
likely to do so in the future. Here the young social assistance claimants again score very 
badly, as they clearly never have contributed. And it is obvious that unemployed aged 
above 50 years are likely to score much higher on this dimension. After all most of the 
unemployed above 50 years have contributed to the common ‘us’ in the past. 
These deservingness criteria have primarily been used to explain variations in 
public support for welfare policy across different areas. Coughlin’s pioneering cross-
national study from 1980 found what he calls ‘a universal dimension of support’ because 
the ranking of the deserving groups followed the same line in all the countries included in 
his study. The public was most in favour of support for old people, followed by support 
for sick and disabled, needy families with children and unemployed. The group given 
least support were people on social assistance. Petterson (1995), Oorschot (2000), 
Oorschot & Arts (2005), Oorschot (2005) and others have confirmed this ranking and 
often explained it with differences in the fulfilment of the deservingess criteria. These 
studies seem to support our argument but they do not provide empirical findings that 
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allow us to distinguish between different groups of unemployed. Neither do they directly 
deal with the issue of new labour market polices. This lack of knowledge set the agenda 
for the empirical analyses below. 
However, before turning to the empirical part it is worth noticing that the previous 
empirical studies seem to find a strong degree of consensus about these criteria. The 
deservingness studies have not focused much on that part but based on a Dutch study 
Oorschot concludes ‘that “social division” or “class” variables like income level and 
whether one is working or on benefit do not play a role in the conditionality of solidarity’ 
(Oorschot 2000:40). In our context it is an important finding as it suggests that the typical 
defenders of the rights of unemployed, the unions and the left wing parties, actually have 
members and constituencies that would find harsher policies towards specific groups 
quite fair. And the other way around that the right wing parties typically in favour of 
harsher treatment of unemployed actually might have members and constituencies that 
would find ‘softer’ policies toward specific groups quite fair. If this kid of broad 
consensus is present we would expect a strong political logic behind the policy 
convergence, i.e. both left and right wing parties would have to adapt their policies to the 
voter preferences (see below).  
 
Data and method  
In order to substantiate the argument we have to use survey data that distinguish between 
different groups of unemployed and explicitly focus on the implementation of active 
labour market policy. Such data are rare. No cross-national data have these characteristics 
and we have not been able to find national European data with this structure. Therefore 
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we rely on a national survey from Australia. The items we use are found in the survey on 
Coping With Economic and Social Change, which was conducted by the Social Policy 
Research Centre in 1999. 4041 questionnaires where sent out to a random national 
sample of adults. 2403 questionnaires were returned, which (allowing for a small number 
that were returned indicating that the person had moved) gives an effective response rate 
around 62 per cent. In general this is a fair result for a national postal survey but in order 
to adjust for possible bias a weight (comparing the survey with census data) was 
constructed. This weight it used in the analyses even though it only makes very little 
differences to the presented results. Further introduction to the data can be found in 
Saunders, Thomson & Evans (2000).  
In the following we will only use the items that measure the requirements that 
unemployed according to the respondents should be required to fulfil in order to receive 
unemployment benefits. We distinguish between young unemployed (below 25 years), 
old unemployed (above 50 years), and long-term unemployed (of any age).3 For each 
group the respondents were asked about their opinion towards nine different 
requirements. Below we examine these empirical results. Firstly, we give a overall 
descriptive presentation, which to some extent replicates Eardley, Saunders & Evans’s 
(2000) more general presentation of the results. Secondly, we analyse the level of 
consensus behind these popular images of the target groups. We look at the different 
attitudes across political parties and across respondents with different chances of being 
exposed to the new policies. From the discussion above we expect the consensus across 
different groups to be quite high and therefore the political logic to be quit strong. Finally 
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we analyse the influence of various background variables in a multivariate regression 
model.  
 
 
Different requirements to different groups 
Table 2 shows, which, if any, of nine listed activities unemployed should be required to 
undertake in order to receive the Australian means-tested unemployment benefits. The 
requirements are ranked after the difference between the requirements that respectively 
young and old unemployed might be obliged to fulfil; starting with the largest 
differences.  
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Table 2: Requirement for receiving unemployment benefits. Per cent and average number 
requirement per group.  
 
 Percentage point 
differences 
Requirements 
 
1: Young 
unemployed 
(under 25) 
2: Older 
unemployed 
(above 50) 
3: Long-
term 
unemployed 
(of any age) 
1-2 1-3 2-3 
Take part in a ‘work for 
the dole’ scheme 
 
83 38 72 +45 +11 -34 
Move to another town or 
city to find work 
 
49 9 41 +40 +8 -32 
Look for work 93 
 
54 81 +39 +12 -27 
Complete a ‘dole 
diary’detailing efforts to 
find work 
 
80 41 71 +39 +9 -30 
Change appearance (e.g. 
get a haircut) 
 
71 34 58 +37 +13 -24 
Improve reading and 
writing skills 
 
84 51 75 +33 +9 -24 
Accepted any paid job 
offered 
 
65 33 65 +32 0ns -32 
Undergo a training or re-
training program 
 
82 62 81 +20 +1ns -19 
Undertake useful work in 
the community 
 
79 63 77 +15 +2 -14 
Average number of 
requirements  
 
6.9 3.9 6.2    
Standard deviation  2.2 
 
2.7 2.7    
n = 2373, missing = 30. 
Note: Since respondents were simply asked to tick a box if they thought a particular requirement should 
apply, it is possible that some of those failing to tick a box were not positively disagreeing with the 
proposition but were just not responding. In order to allow for this, we follow Eardley, Saunders and Evans 
(2000:18) and only treat those cases where respondents also failed to complete other related questions on 
the same page of the as missing. These amounted to only 1.2 per cent of cases. Of those cases counted as 
valid, only 0.4 ticked no boxes.All percentage point differences are significant at 0.01 level; except those 
marked “ns” (these are above the 0.05 level). 
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The largest difference was found on the issue of required participation in a ‘work for the 
dole’ scheme. ‘Work for the dole’ is the Australian name for a compulsory activation 
scheme, which was introduced in 1997. 83 per cent of the population answered that 
young unemployed should be required to participate in these schemes in order to receive 
benefits. Only 38 per cent answered that unemployed above 50 years should meet the 
same requirement. It gives the percentage difference of +45 (83-38) seen in the fourth 
column. The second largest difference was found on the issue of moving to another town 
or city to find work.  49 per cent answered that young should be required to do so. The 
figure for old unemployed was only 9 per cent. Thirdly, there is a remarkable difference 
in public attitudes to active job search. 93 percent answered ‘looking for a job’ should be 
required from the young.  For the old the figure was just 54 per cent. Thus, taken literally 
46 percent of the Australians actually indicate that job search should not be a requirement 
for old unemployed. Percentage differences above 30 were also found on such 
requirement as a) complete a ‘dole diary’ (which was a new measure introduced in 1996), 
b) change appearance (e.g. get a haircut), c) improve reading and writing skills, and d) 
accept any paid job offered. Smaller but still significant differences were found for 
training and re-training (percentage differece,+20) and community work (percentage 
difference,+15). Summarized as the average number of requirements, the figure is 3.9 for 
old unemployed and 6.9 for young unemployed (see table2). Thus, so far it is safe to 
conclude that we see a remarkable difference when the public respectively is asked about 
the old and young unemployed. All differences are significant at a 0.01 level.   
 However, in order to be sure that these two target groups really distinguish 
themselves, as our theoretical argument suggests, it is fruitful to use the category ‘long-
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term unemployed (of any age)’ as a reference category.  The percentages differences 
shown in the last two columns of table 2 indicate that we find the expected pattern. In the 
second last column we find positive differences on 8 out of the 9 items. Thus, as expected 
the public is more inclined to put requirements on the young unemployed than on the 
long-term unemployed. The differences are fairly large and clearly statistical significant 
when it comes to ‘take part in a work for the dole scheme’, ‘move to another town or 
city’, ‘look for work’, ‘complete a dole diary’,  ‘change appearance’, and ‘improve 
reading and writing skills’. When it comes to ‘accept any paid job’, and ‘undergo 
training’ no significant difference was found between young unemployed and long-term 
unemployed. Summarized as the average number of requirements the figures are 6.2 for 
long-term unemployed and 6.9 for the young unemployed. As to the differences between 
long-term unemployed and old-unemployed the pattern is even clearer (all differences 
significant at a 0.01 level). On four out of the nine questions the percentage differences 
were above 30. On three questions, the percentage differences were above 20. And on the 
remaining two questions the percentage differences were above 10.  
 These overall findings give strong support to our theoretical argument. The 
political costs of introducing harsher labour market policy seem modest when it comes to 
unemployed below 25 years. Actually, it seems to be a matter of credit claming rather 
than a matter of blame avoidance. On eight out of the nine suggested requirements a clear 
majority indicated that young unemployed could be asked to fulfill them. A majority even 
indicated that young unemployed might be required to get a haircut in order to receive 
benefits.  It is also clear that expanding harsh labour market policy to unemployed aged 
above 50 years could potentially have large political costs. On five out of the nine 
 18
suggested requirements a clear majority did not think old unemployed could be asked to 
fulfill them. Not even a rather ‘soft’ policy such as an obligation to take part in an 
activation scheme was supported by a majority.  
 
The public consensus about treating unemployed citizens differently  
From a theoretical point of view one could argued that the political costs of harsher 
labour market policy cannot be directly calculated from the majority-minority arguments 
just presented. The majority might be in favor of a given policy but their incentives to 
mobilize political support are limited. To put it boldly, the majority does not make 
demonstrations that demand harsher labour market policy. In contrast the group affected 
by a given policy could potentially mobilize against it and thereby potentially generate 
large political costs. Nevertheless, this sections agues that it is not the case when it comes 
to the different treatment of young and old unemployed. We argue that the self-interest 
argument does not apply because the public judgment of deservingness is rooted in a 
moral logic that is broadly shared. As already mentioned we also broaden the perspective 
somewhat by looking at attitudes of the electorate of the two major parties. One could 
suggest that left-wing voters could be mobilized against the harsher treatment of young 
unemployed and right wing voters could be mobilized against the soft policy towards the 
old unemployed. Nevertheless, again we suggest that it is not the case, as these attitudes 
are believed to be rooted in deservingness judgments that are shared across party lines. If 
we can be proved right in these suggestions it further supports the argument of modest 
political costs connected to introducing harsher policy towards young unemployed and 
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large political costs connected to expanding harsher policy to the group of old 
unemployed.   
 We start out with the broad approach and look at the attitudes of the electorate of 
the two major parties. We distinguish between those who generally vote for the main left-
wing party, the Labor party, and those who generally vote for the main right-wing party, 
the Liberal party, or the smaller right-wing party, the National party. Finally, we have a 
group of others, which include voters for the Australian Democrats, swing voters and 
others. In table 3 the requirements are listed after the percentage differences between left-
wing voters and right-wing voters when asked about requirements of young unemployed. 
As expected the right-wing voters are more in favor of requirements than the left-wing 
voters. Only when it comes to ‘looking for job’ was the difference modest but still 
statistical significant. However, it is striking that a clear majority of left-wing voters in 
eight out of nine cases is in favor of the suggested requirements. Even a majority of left-
wing voters think that unemployed below 25 years could be asked to get a haircut in 
order to receive benefits. Only on the requirement of moving to another city do we not 
find a majority in favor of one of the suggested requirements. Thus, even among the labor 
voters do harsher labor market policies towards young unemployed seem to be a winning 
strategy and opposing it a losing strategy. Among the right-wing voters there is no doubt 
that it is a winning strategy.    
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Table 3: Requirements in order to receive benefits, respectively for young unemployed 
(below 25) and old unemployed (above 50+), answers distributed among main political 
groups 
 
 
 
Requirements to young 
unemployed (under 25) 
 
Requirements to old 
unemployed (50+) 
 Left-
wing 
voters 
Right-
wing 
voters 
Others Left-
wing 
voters 
Right- 
wing 
voters 
Others 
Change appearance (e.g. 
get a haircut) 
 
66 83 69 26 39 38 
Take part in a ‘work for 
the dole’ scheme 
 
75 91 83 29 47 42 
Undertake useful work in 
the community 
 
72 86 80 53 70 70 
Improve reading and 
writing skills 
 
79 89 85 44 52 57 
Move to another town or 
city to find work 
 
45 58 47 7 13 11 
Complete a ‘dole 
diary’detailing efforts to 
find work 
 
76 85 79 36 47 43 
Accepted any paid job 
offered 
 
64 74 62 29 40 35 
Undergo a training or re-
training program 
 
79 85 83 59ns 62 63 
Look for work 
 
92 94 94 49 56 59 
N unweighted 777 810 638 777 810 638 
All differences between left and right wing voters are significant at 0.01; except differences in 
attitudes towards training of old unemployed (0.11). 
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When it comes to old unemployed we find the opposite situation. Among the left-wing 
voters imposing harsher requirement is clearly a losing-strategy; at least if it includes 
such measures as requiring old unemployed to ‘change appearance’, ‘take part in work 
for the dole scheme’, ‘move to another town’, ‘complete a dole diary’, and ‘accept any 
jobs’. A majority is in favor of ‘training’ (59 percent) but even on such soft measures as 
‘doing community service’ (53 per cent) and ‘looking for work’ (49 percent) is the left-
wing voters split in halves. The right-wing voters are more ready to put requirements on 
unemployed above 50 years. But again a clear majority in favor can only be found when 
it comes to such ‘soft’ requirements as ‘undertake community service’ (70 per cent) and 
‘undergo a training or re-training program’ (62 per cent). On the requirements of ‘take 
part in a work for the dole scheme’ (47 per cent), ‘improve reading and writing skills’ (52 
per cent), ‘complete a dole diary’ (47 percent), and ‘look for work’ (56 per cent) the 
right-wing voters are more or less split in halves. It is remarkable that only 54 per cent of 
right-wing voters support the basic requirement of job search. Still one could argue that 
among liberal voters there could be an electoral basic for conducting a harsher labor 
market policy towards those above 50 years. But it is clear that the labor party would 
have very strong incentives to oppose such a policy and probably could impose large 
political costs on a liberal government conducting such a policy. Thus, the overall 
argument is that for both major parties it is winning strategy to support harsher policy 
towards young and a losing strategy to support harsher policy towards old unemployed.  
 Finally, we turn to the attitudes of the groups most directly affected by the labor 
market policies in question, i.e. those who could have a ‘concentrated’ interest in 
mobilizing for or against the policies in question. First of all that means unemployed 
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below 25 years and unemployed between 50 and 65 years (65 years is the official 
Australian retirement age for men). However, even though the sample is rather large we 
only have respectively 9 and 12 respondents in each of these subgroups. This is not 
sufficient for a reliable analysis. Therefore we add the 29 employed respondents aged 
below 25 that answered that they ‘worry all the time‘ or ‘worry sometimes’ about losing 
their job. This gives us 38 young respondents in - or in perceived risk of - unemployment. 
In the same way we add the 114 aged between 50 and 64 years, which worries about 
loosing their job. It gives us a group of 124 old respondents in - or in perceived risk of - 
unemployment (one old unemployed had not answered the question of job security and 
one had not answered the requirement questions, therefore we do not end up with 126 
respondents). The results are shown in table 4.  
 The most important overall result is the striking lack of difference between those 
in risk of being exposed to the requirements and the other groups. If we compare the 
attitudes of the ‘young risk group’ and the attitudes of the other age groups we find 
percentage differences below 10, except in one case. In terms of ‘looking for job’ (98 per 
cent), ‘improve reading and writing skills’ (86 per cent), ‘undergo a training or re-
training program’ (84 per cent), and ‘complete a dole diary’ (82 per cent) the ‘young risk 
group’ actually seem a bit more in favor of establishing requirements for unemployment 
benefits. In terms of  ‘take part in a work for the dole program’ (75 per cent), ‘take part in 
community work’ (71 per cent), ‘change appearance’ (68 per cent), and ‘move to another 
town’ (45 per cent) the ‘young risk group’ is slightly less in favor. Moving to another city 
and acceptance of any paid job offered (40 per cent) is the only two items where we do 
not find a majority of the ‘young risk group’ being in favor. And only in the latter case - 
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the acceptance of any paid job - do we find a large difference between the risk group (40 
per cent) and the other age groups (66 per cent). This latter difference is significant while 
all the other differences turns out to be statistical insignificant. Thus, as long as new 
active labor market policies do not force young to move to another city or take any paid 
job offered, the results indicate that not even those exposed to the policy will mobilize 
against it. And if they were to mobilize against it, e.g. the requirement of taking any paid 
job offered they would not have a good case; a majority in the electorate support that 
requirement. Resistance to the requirement of moving to another town would be a better 
case. Nevertheless, our overall interpretation is that the target group actually imposes the 
moral logic of the deservingness criteria on themselves.  
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Table 4: Requirements in order to receive benefits, respectively for young unemployed 
(below 25) and old unemployed (50+), answers distributed among risk groups 
(unemployed or in risk of unemployment), others in the same age group, and other age 
groups. 
 
 
Requirements to young 
unemployed (under 25) 
 
Requirements to old 
unemployed (50+) 
 Risk 
group 
between 
18-24 
Others 
between 
18-24 
Other 
age 
groups 
Risk 
group 
between 
50-64 
Others 
between 
50-64 
Other 
age 
groups 
Change appearance (e.g. 
get a haircut) 
 
68 74 71 35 33 34 
Take part in a ‘work for 
the dole’ scheme 
 
75 82 83 39 39 38 
Undertake useful work 
in the community 
 
71 80 79 60 64 63 
Improve reading and 
writing skills 
 
86 82 84 48 45 53 
Move to another town 
or city to find work 
 
45 51 49 11 7 10 
Complete a ‘dole 
diary’detailing efforts to 
find work 
 
82 79 80 37 37 42 
Accepted any paid job 
offered 
 
40 62* 66** 41 34 32 
Undergo a training or 
re-training program 
 
84 87 82 64 54 64 
Look for work 
 
98 93 92 53 53 54 
N unweighted 38 163 1981 124 373 1685 
Significant levels between risk groups and the other two groups. All differences are 
insignificant except those marked with * (0.05 level) or ** (0.01 level). 
 25
The same is the case when we look at the differences between the ‘old risk group’ (being 
unemployed or fearing loosing current job) and the other age groups. On eight out of the 
nine requirements the percentage difference is below 6 and all the differences are 
statistical insignificant. The only noteworthy difference is the fact that a larger share of 
the ‘old risk group’ (41 per cent) than of the other age groups (32 per cent) actually 
thinks that old should take any paid job offered. In the ‘old risk group’ a majority support 
such requirements as ‘undertake training or re-training’ (65 per cent) and ‘undertake 
community work’ (60 per cent). On the requirement to ‘look for work’ (53 per cent) and 
‘improve reading and writing skills’ (48 per cent) the target group is – as the rest of the 
electorate – split in halves. And again in line with the other age groups a majority in the 
‘old risk group’ oppose ‘acceptance of any job’ (41 per cent), ‘taking part in work for 
dole schemes’ (39 per cent), ‘completing a dole diary’ (37 per cent), ‘changing 
appearance’ (35 per cent), and ‘mowing to another city’ (11 per cent). Thus, if an active 
labor market policy where to impose such measures on the group of older unemployed 
we would expect the group to mobilize. And they would potentially have a very strong 
case because the other age groups share the same moral logic, which imply that 
unemployed above 50 years should not be subject to such measures.  
 
The public consensus about target groups and background variables 
By means of an ordinary OLS-regression table 5 shows how various background 
variables influence the number of requirements. In model 1 we see the connection 
between the background variables (sex, age, political orientation, experience of 
unemployment and perceived level of unemployment) and the number of requirements 
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put on long-term unemployed. Being a right wing voter and being a women significantly 
increase the number of imposed requirements. Left wing political orientation, experience 
of unemployment, a perception of high level of unemployment in the country, and age all 
significantly decrease the number of requirements put on long-term unemployed. All 
together the model is able to explain nine percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable.  
 Most of these effects are reduced if we instead want to explain the variation in the 
requirements for old and young unemployed. Starting with the former, model II shows 
that the effects from sex and right wing orientation (compared to swing voters, Australian 
Democrats and others) become insignificant. The age effect is also reduced but remains 
significant. The effects from left wing political orientation, unemployment experience 
and perceived level of unemployment remain more or less the same. However, all 
together the explanatory power of the model is reduced to five percent. Thus, as expected 
these standard background variables are of less importance when we ask about 
requirements for old unemployed.  
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Table 5: OLS models for the connection between background variables and requirements. 
Standardized betas and level of significance   
 Model I Model II Model III 
Dependent 
variable 
Number of 
requirement for 
long-term 
unemployed 
Number of 
requirement for old 
unemployed 
Number of 
requirement for 
young unemployed 
Women 0.07** 0.04ns 0.04ns 
Age -0.25** -0.14** -0.02ns 
Right 0,09** 0.04ns 0.16** 
Left -0.09** -0.11** -0.06* 
Unemployment 
experience 
-0.07** -0.06** -0.03ns 
Perceived level of 
unemployment 
-0.06** -0.09** -0.04ns 
R2 9 % 5 % 5% 
 Note: Sex, dummy, 0=men, 1=women. Age, number of years. Right and left, dummies, 
where swing voters, voters for Australian Democrats, and ‘others’ function as reference 
category. Unemployment experience; dummy, 1=respondent or any member of family 
within the last three years, 0=others. Perceived level of unemployment; ordinal from 1 to 
5 (less than 3 %, 3 -6 %, 7-9 %, 10 -12 %, and more than 12 %).   
 
 
The same is the case when we ask about young unemployed. The number of requirements 
for young turns out to be independent of sex and age. More interesting is the finding that 
the requirements for young also turn out to be independent of the voter’s own 
unemployment experiences and the perceived level of unemployment. This is an 
exception to the general finding that attitudes are dependent on actual (or perceived) level 
of unemployemt (see above). Within our framework the interpretation is that the moral 
logic is so strong that it overrules the normal business cycle effect. The effects from 
political orientation remain significant but the overall explanatory power of the model is 
again reduced to five percent.   
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Conclusion and discussion  
The overall aim has been to explain the two common features in the OECD countries’ 
shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ labor market policy; namely 1) that those first exposed to 
the new labour market policies and those exposed to the harshest measures were young 
people  on social assistance (typically below 25 years) and 2) that many countries made 
special rules for the old unemployed (typically aged above 50 years or 55 years), as the 
active labor market policy was extended to include ‘ordinary’ unemployed. Theoretically, 
we explained this convergence by combining the ‘new politics theory’ of blame 
avoidance and the literature on deservingness. The point was that the group of young 
people on social assistance had very large difficulties in fulfilling five central 
deservingness criteria and therefore the political cost of introducing harsher labor market 
policy towards this groups were modest. In contrast older unemployed fulfilled a number 
of the deservingness criteria and therefore the political costs of exposing this group to a 
harsher labor market policy were quite high.In our opinion this political logic seems more 
obvious than any economic reason behind the striking policy convergence.  
 We were not able to support the argument by cross-national data but based on an 
Australian survey we were able to illustrate the suggested political logic. In the 
Australian data we saw a very large difference in the public attitudes towards 
unemployed aged below 25 years and unemployed aged above 50 years. In the former 
case a clear majority, even within the target group and even among those who typically 
vote for the left-wing party, was in favor of introducing rather tough requirements in 
order to receive benefits. Thus, in electoral terms introducing harsher policy towards this 
group was clearly a winning strategy and opposing it clearly a losing strategy. In the 
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latter case a majority, even within other age groups and in many cases even among the 
right-wing voters, was against imposing harsher requirements on unemployed aged above 
50 years.  
 It is difficult directly to prove that the moral logic of deservingness criteria 
influence public policy. However, if we turn to the Australian policy process a number of 
things support the argument. Firstly, it was a labor government that started the new active 
policies towards young unemployed. The first initiative can be dated back to the Hawke 
labor government, which in 1988 replaced unemployment benefits for youth under 18 
with a so-called Job search allowance, incorporating “strong ties between continuing 
income support and participation in work, training or jobsearch activities” (DEET, 1987, 
17); even for social democrats this was a winning policy. Labor’s ‘Working nation 
reforms’ in the mid 1990s did impose stricter general rules for all unemployed but at the 
same time exceptions were made for older workers – most notably a new Mature Age 
allowance, which did not include any activity test at all.   
 Secondly, when the conservative and liberal Howard coalition came into office in 
1996 the proclaimed general fight against “passive welfare” and “welfare dependency” 
(e.g. Parker & Fopp, 2004; Shaver, 2002) was indeed sensitive to public perception of 
target groups. The two most fundamental changes to “passive welfare” – the Work for the 
dole program from 1997 and the Mutual obligation program from 1998 – were initially 
limited to unemployed between 18 and 24 years old. Gradually other groups also came to 
be included but despite the liberal and conservative political rhetoric the Howard 
coalition has been cautious when it comes to the oldest unemployed. It took the coalition 
10 years to abolish the Mature age allowance, which actually comes close to an early 
 30
retirement scheme. The Mutual obligation program was expanded to include all 
unemployed up to the age of 49 years. However, the requirements are somewhat reduced 
for unemployed between 40 and 49 years old and those above are still not included in the 
mutual obligation program (Australian Government, 2007). The coalition has imposed 
some participation requirements on older unemployed as well as sole parents with school 
age children and disability support pensioners. Thus, the positive images of these target 
groups have not made changes impossible. But the changes have been less significant and 
it has taken much longer time to impose them.  
 Finally, it can be discussed to what extent one can generalize from the Australian 
case to other OECD countries. Here we would argue that Australia actually can be seen 
as a ‘conservative’ case. As Australia do not have an insurance system, we speak about 
old unemployed, which in other countries would be labeled social assistance claimants 
above 50 years. The previous empirical findings within the deservingness literature 
clearly suggest that had the older been insured, the difference in the public images of the 
target groups would probably have been even larger.  
 One could also ask whether the results only are valid under the given Australian 
business cycle conditions. As mentioned we do have empirical findings that show a 
relationship between level of unemployment and public explanations of poverty. 
However, at the time of interview the unemployed rate was 6.9 in Australia (OECD 
standardized, around 7.5 according to national definition), which is a middle positions 
compared to other the OECD countries. Thus, it is not extremely low which could have 
contributed to a tough judgment of unemployed. Neither is it extremely high, which 
could have contributed to a soft judgment of the unemployed. Furthermore, as the public 
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attitudes towards old and young are measured at the same point in time one should not 
expect the differences between the groups to be affected by the business cycle, only the 
overall levels.  
 Lastly one could also ask whether the results are valid across welfare regimes 
(Esping-andersen, 1990). We do have reasons to believe that liberal welfare regimes 
generate more reluctant attitudes towards unemployed and poor (Albrekt Larsen, 2006). 
However, firstly, the electorate in Australian is known to have more egalitarian attitudes 
than the electorate in USA, which typically serve as the country that comes closest to the 
ideal type liberal regime. In Feather’s classic study from 1974, which replicated Feagin’s 
American study (1972), he concluded that the Australians were less inclined than the 
Americans to explain poverty with individual causes. Secondly, even though the overall 
toughness towards poor and unemployed is larger in liberal regimes, we have reasons to 
believe that the differences in the judgment of young unemployed and old unemployed 
found in Australia are rooted in a number of deservingness criteria, which according to 
previous studies apply across all OECD countries. Therefore we dare to argue that in 
order to understand the way active labor market policy is implemented, not only in 
Australia but also in most of the other OECD countries, it is crucial to take the moral 
deservingness logic into account. Furthermore, we argue that the literature of ’the new 
politics’ of the welfare state needs to supplement the narrow self-interest perspective with 
these deservingness logics in order to make a good a account of variations in 
retrenchment and restructuring policies.  
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Notes  
                                               
1
 The only thing we have is some general country descriptions about the ‘active turn’, e.g.  Clasen & Clegg 
, forthcoming; Lødemel & Trickey, 2000.  
2
 We also suggest these differences in treatment would be even more obvious if one looked at the actually 
implementation instead of the formal rules. Again this suggestion is based on country specific knowledge 
about the implementation of active labour market policy in the Nordic countries and it is outside the scope 
of the article to deliver solid proofs.    
3
 As Australia has no ordinary insurance based unemployment system but only a state run means tested 
program, we do not have to distinguish between insured and non-insured. Naturally, this is also a limitation 
to the data. But on the positive side this ‘isolation’ of the age-effect actually makes a critical case for older 
unemployed, i.e. do even older non-insured unemployed have a much more positive popular image than 
young non-insured unemployed? 
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